In Humean analyses of the emergence and stability of moral rules, ideas of justice and reciprocity originate in non-moral, conventional solutions to conflicts of interest in human interaction. This theory seems contrary to an empirical claim made by some developmental psychologists: that, from...

In this experiment, individuals recurrently play coordination games that are similar to, but not identical with, one another. Initially, subjects are no more successful than if they had acted at random, but coordination rates gradually increase to levels similar to those found in one-shot games...

Previous studies suggest that two otherwise robust 'anomalies' – preference reversals and disparities between buying and selling valuations – are eroded when respondents participate in repeated markets. We report an experiment which investigates whether this is true when factors...

This paper looks at the philosophical foundations of rational-choice theory. It is argued that L. Savage's expected-utility axioms cannot be defended as requirements of instrumental rationality, in part because of their implications for the description of consequences. Then it is argued that...

Since homo sapiens is a social animal, one might expect human nature - the set of psychological propensities with which our species is naturally endowed - to equip human beings to live in social groups. In this chapter, we consider the implications of this idea for economics and game theory. We...