Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How...

Dans Cet Article, Nous Presentons un Probleme de Choix D'investissement En Incertitude. au Moment de Prendre Leurs Decisions, les Administrateurs Ne Connaissent Pas la Taille du Marche(Volume des Ventes) Mais Connaissent le Prix de Vente du Produit et la Distribution a Priori du Niveau des...

In This Paper, We Generalize Hoy and Robson (1981) Analysis and We Provide a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Insurance Not to Be Giffen. the Condition Gives a Bound for the Variation of the Absolute Risk Avesion Which Pemits the Wealth Effect to Be Always Dominated by the Subsitution Effect.