From the New York Times bestselling author of This Time Is Different, “a fascinating and important book” (Ben Bernanke) about the surprising reasons why paper money lies at the heart of many of the world’s most difficult problemsThe world is drowning in cash—and it’s making us poorer...

In this paper we analyze the interaction of income and preference heterogeneity in a political economy framework. We ask whether the presence of preference heterogeneity (arising, for example, from different ethnic groups or geographic locations) affects the ability of the poor to extract...

Despite the well-known gains from trade, trade liberalization is politically one of the most contentious actions that a government can take. We propose and formalize a new argument, having to do with uncertainty, which is complementary to the usual explanations for why that is the case: many...

Standard models of public education provision predict an implicit transfer of resources from higher income individuals toward lower income individuals. Many studies have documented that public higher education involves a transfer in the reverse direction. We show that this pattern of...

The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements, with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade. This article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their...

This paper examines a process of debt renegotiation in which banks possess divergent interests and there is asymmetric information. The authors assume that large banks must exert pressure on small banks in order to obtain participation of these in the provision of new money and in debt...

This paper examines a two-sector small open economy that is subject to shocks in its terms-of-trade. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs use implicit contracts to insure risk-averse workers against fluctuations in their income. The characteristics of these contracts are examined within a general...

We present a simple model of sovereign debt crises in which a country chooses its optimal mix of short and long-term debt contracts subject to standard contracting frictions: the country cannot commit to repay its debts nor to a specific path of future debt issues, and contracts cannot be made...