The thesis of this paper is that human capital is inalienable: it cannot be bought or sold. Control of physical capital proved the means by which one agent influences another. That is, the pattern of property rights over physical assets is important in the determination of incentives. Recent...

Consider an entrepreneur whocneeds to raise funds from an investor, but cannot commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a default or quit puts an upper bound on the total indebtedness from the entrepreneur to the investor at any date. We characterize the...

We propose a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example, in developing economies, or in economies in transition) - although it can be used in all economies.

We analyse the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract - specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment - under the assumption that some debt...

This paper is a theoretical study into how credit constraints intereact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. We construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured. In such an economy, durable...

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the...

The paper presents a model of a monetary economy where there are differences in liquidity across assets. Money circulates because it is more liquid than other assets, not because it has any special function. There is a spectrum of returns on assets, reflecting their differences in liquidity. The...

We analyze bidder collusion in public procurement. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels. We use public information on convicted bid-rigging schemes taken from the decisions of the French Competition Authority to tackle the question of external cartel stability. Our goal is to...

We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents have ideas, but these ideas conflict. We suppose that decisionâ€making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain of command, and the most senior person with an idea exercises authority. We analyze...

We develop a framework for modelling differences in liquidity across assets in order to examine the interactions between asset prices, liquidity premia and aggregate activity. In so doing, we want to find out what role government policy might have through open market operations that change the...