A central determinant of the political economy of capital-labor relations is tha appropriability of specific quasi-rents. This paper is concerned with the general-equilibrium interaction of appropriability and characteristics of technology - nam ely, the embodiment of technology in capital and...

We study numerical simulations of a standard trade model with labor mobility costs added, modeled in such a way as to generate gross flows in excess of net flows. We find that adjustment to a trade shock can take a long time with plausible values of parameter values. In our base case, for the...

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria...

This paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is presented first showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A generalequilibrium, endogenous growth model is...

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE), wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a...