A two-person general-sum repeated game with vanishing actions is an infinitely repeated game where the players face the following restrictions. Each action must be used by player k ∈ {1,2} at least once in every rk ∈ ℕ consecutive stages, otherwise the action vanishes for the remaining...

In this paper we study and compute E-points in an explicit way for diagonal games of three, four, five and n-players.

We define a duality of solutions in coalitional games that we call a twisted duality. This twisted duality extends the rule of self-duality in bankruptcy problems. After showing that the prekernel and prenucleolus exhibit twisted duality, we define a twisted reduced game property and...

A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and sabotaging have two effects — they influence the...

In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities for cooperation are restricted and the benefits of a group of players depend on how these players are internally connected. One way to represent this type of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the...

This paper presents selected contributions from the 6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment that was held in Zaragoza (Spain) from 10 to 12 of July 2006. The dramatic increase in the application and use of game theory models for...

An adaptive oligopoly model, where the demand function is isoelastic and the competitors operate under constant marginal costs, is considered. The Cournot equilibrium point then loses stability through a subcritical Neimark bifurcation. The present paper focuses some global bifurcations, which...

A buyout option enhances an auction by allowing a bidder to purchase the item at a pre-specified price (instead of attempting to obtain the item by way of auction). A comparison is made between the ex ante welfare of bidders in an auction with a buyout option to a traditional auction with no...

In this short note we extend the very well known Centipede game of Rosenthal to the same extensive games with perfect information. The only difference that here the Centipede games have instead of numbers as payoff functions, they have variables. We introduce and study the relationship between...

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided....