This study aims to provide a neo-institutional explanation of why South Korea increasingly intends to share its developmental experience with the rest of the world. South Korea's knowledge sharing projects are the leading example of expansionary and self-defining efforts of its aid...

Optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending. In developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds, so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption. We analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment...

Resumen: La corrupción se puede definir como "el abuso de la autoridad o confianza pública con fines privados". Sin embargo, esta definición sugiere que la corrupción es una enfermedad de la sociedad y no un síntoma resultante de problemas estructurales como la inequidad o falta de...

In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization...

The paper examines the division of tasks required between politicians and bureaucrats to run an effective rural employment guarantee scheme (EGS) in India, in the context of Indian history and habits. There are still weaknesses in the incentive structure of the new nationwide EGS. First, there...

Recent work in the area of tax evasion and fiscal corruption in LDCs has highlighted incentive theory and has produced some useful innovations in measurement. An interesting contrarian strain of research suggests that corruption and smuggling are sometimes use as tools of government, instead of...

This study aims to provide a neo-institutional explanation of why South Korea increasingly intends to share its developmental experience with the rest of the world. South Korea's knowledge sharing projects are the leading example of expansionary and self-defining efforts of its aid...

Under what circumstances does corruption cause inefficiencies, and when are bribes merely a transfer? I propose a modified monopoly price discrimination model showing how corruption may lead to an increased administrative burden in firm-government interactions. The model highlights the...

A bilateral danger of underperformance exists when two parties sink investments with payoffs dependent on the behavior of the other. There are five general categories of defense against that danger: (1) Legal action against a misbehaving co-investor; (2) Reliance on a reputation for...

We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anticorruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014 using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in economic activity concentrated in...