We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that...

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good...

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function....

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...

The adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists, like the recent “parity law” in France, can be fully rationalized on the basis of the self interest of male incumbent politicians. This paper explains why the parity law was approved in its form and, at the same time, why it has not been very...

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our...