In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a "max-min group contest", as defined by Chowdhury et al....

We study effort provision and incentivisation in a Tullock group-contest with m Ï 2 groups that differ in size. A novel algorithmic procedure is presented that, under a symmetry assumption, explicitly characterises the equilibrium. Endogenous, optimal incentivisation schemes are then...

Citizens political participation to protests is a crucial issue for any political system, whether democratic or autocratic. Political systems have different ways of dealing with citizens' protests, determining cost and benefit of public dissent, responding to public requests and allowing...

We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...