Showing 111 - 120 of 1,399
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708441
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708496
This paper describes a dynamic model in which the provision mechanism for a public project is itself the object of locational choice of individuals. Individuals in an ongoing society must choose between a Majority Rule mechanism and a Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Each mechanism determines a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005712957
A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118531
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118537
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118543
This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single date...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118562
The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118607
This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are "players" who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008483500
Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We study properties of dynamic enfranchisement games, dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698213