In some experiments, rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. The authors bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, they suppose that the observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their...

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash Equilibrium.

Ordinarily labor market equilibrium implies that the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, and that the employer is indifferent between equally productive employees. When the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, employer preferences do not matter. If, however, the marginal...

In a monetary model, it is shown that if there is a unique Pareto inefficient barter equilibrium, then a monetary equilibrium exists when traders are sufficiently patient. Copyright 1989 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

This paper compares two different models in a common environment. The first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot sell short. The second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so much that they would want to default, but is...

The authors study the steady states of a system in which players learn about the strategies their opponents are playing by updating their Bayesian priors in light of their observations. Players are matched.at random to play a fixed extensive-form game and each player observes the realized...