A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

We propose a utility representation for preferences over risky timed outcomes, the weighted temporal utility model. It separates subjective evaluations of outcomes from attitudes towards psychological distance induced by risks and delays. Subjective evaluations of outcomes may depend on the time...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

Abstract This paper argues that observations of non-stationary choice behavior need not necessarily imply specific properties of the individual's discount function. As we show, the observed preference reversals in intertemporal choice are consistent with constant discounting and can...

We provide characterizations of the set of outcomes that can be achieved by agenda manipulation for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and super-majority voting with arbitrary quota q are special cases of the general sequential...