This paper introduces "harassment" in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....

The paper attempts to construct political influence variables and explain discrepancies in fund disbursement through proper econometric specification in the Indian context.

A rising wage-gap, almost universally, in the last two decades has contradicted the age-old conventional wisdom of asymmetric wage movements across nations when trade is liberalized. We offer an explanation that fits well with the emerging trade pattern between the developed and more advanced...

Trade statistics reported through official sources may not provide the right information because a regulated system does not induce truthful revelation. Hence, policy prescriptions or evaluations based on official statistics can be misleading. For example, the impact of a devaluation on exports...

In a simple model based on political support approach, we show that poor and less egalitarian societies may impose a lower tax rate contrary to the prediction of the median voter approach. This is consistent with the available empirical findings. In the framework developed in this paper, the...