Hold-up arises when part of the return on an agent’s relationship-specific investments is ex post expropriable by his trading partner. The hold-up problem has played an important role as a foundation of modern contract and organization theory, as the associated inefficiencies have justified...

We consider a model of bribery in an asymmetric procurement auction. In return for a bribe from the dishonest supplier, the auctioneer has the discretion to allow this supplier to revise his bid downward to match the low bid of the honest supplier. The dishonest supplier can also win the...

The buyer solicits bids from suppliers with different cost distributions defined by their capacities. The expected market share of each supplier is the ratio of its capacity to the industry capacity. The buyer's optimal reserve price declines with increases in the concentration of the industry....

Two manufacturers distribute their brands through exclusive retail dealers and must compete for consumers indirectly by inducing retailers to carry their brands. The authors compare equilibrium outcomes with and without resale price maintenance. Maximum resale price maintenance lowers the retail...

One of the important issues in the literature on monopolistic competition concerns whether the free entry equilibrium will provide sufficient variety of differentiated brands. This paper examines variety issue using the logit choice model to capture brand differentiation. The consumption value...