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original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
Alkan, Ahmet - In: Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 1, pp. 99-111
shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the … same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet …) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147314
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Stable Schedule Matchings
Komornik, Vilmos; Komornik, Zsolt; Viauroux, Christelle - Economics Department, University of Maryland-Baltimore … - 2010
In order to treat a natural schedule matching problem related with worker-firm matchings, we generalize some theorems of Baiou--Balinski and Alkan--Gale by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552108
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Stable Matchings for the Room-mates Problem
Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325151
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Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria
Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2007
The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094057
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Stable Matchings for the Room-mates Problem
Lahiri, Somdeb - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423271
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Stable matchings for the room-mates problem
Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593838
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Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games
Llerena, Francesc; Pallarola, Carlos Rafels - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2004
consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138819
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On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
Echenique, Federico; Chambers, Christopher P. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599507
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On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684957
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The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
Echenique, Federico; Lee, SangMok; Shum, Matthew; … - 2011
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characterization of the data that are rationalizable as a stable matching when agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189213