[...]In this article, we explore the relationship betweenfranchise value and risk taking over the 1986-94 period.We extend Keeley’s empirical analysis by estimating theeffect of franchise value on a variety of measures of bankrisk. We find an inverse relationship between franchisevalue and an...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm’s profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value--a firm's profit-generating potential--as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value a firm's profit-generating potential as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm's profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. In the presence of...