Showing 81 - 90 of 445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009629517
Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722845
From a variant of Kuhn's triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724858
amp;#65279;An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729411
We examine Hillas and Kohlberg's conjecture that invariance to the addition of payoff-redundant strategies implies that a backward induction outcome survives deletion of strategies that are inferior replies to all equilibria with the same outcome. That is, invariance and backward induction imply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012730970
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015359373
We posit a standard model of an asymmetric double auction with interdependent values in which each trader observes a private signal about a hidden state before submitting a bid or ask price for a unit demand or supply. The state and signals are one-dimensional, traders’ signals are independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211338
We define the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For games in this class we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game and minimax or Nash equilibrium strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168549
Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements that select connected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The first axiom requires all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each player's strategy is an admissible optimal reply to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210404
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001187128