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On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Solan, Eilon; Rosenberg, Dinah; Vieille, Nicolas - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236143

Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236146

Perturbed Markov Chains

Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236147

On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236149

Approximating a Sequence of Approximations by a Simple Process

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236150

Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236151

Continuous-time Games of Timing

Laraki, Rida; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236168

Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements

Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236176

Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236181

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

GOSSNER, Olivier; VIEILLE, Nicolas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008285