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Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences : an impossibility result

Cho, Wonki Jo; Thomson, William - In: Games and economic behavior 142 (2023), pp. 1012-1017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014470912

Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

Shinozaki, Hiroki - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-24

desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the … case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418154

When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?

Kazumura, Tomoya - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013465506

Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University - 2008

In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under … strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710066

Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem

Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es; Neme, … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823954

Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing

Ju, Biung-Ghi - Department of Economics, University of Kansas - 2003

rules satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, when aggregate uncertainty holds, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057394

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

RAMAEKERS, Eve; KAYI, Cagatay - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency … not know agents’ waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency … that even non-single-valued rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness if and only if they select …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042819

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Serizawa, Shigehiro; Morimoto, Shuhei - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2

the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773117

Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 1-14

-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

Moreno, Diego; Moscoso, María José - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2010

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -- i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838391