We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in co-investment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have...

The rate of return earned on a deposit can depend on its term, the amount of money invested in it, or both. Most banks, for example, offer a higher interest rate for longer term deposits. This implies that if one individual has capital available for investment now, but needs it in the next...

We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility...

In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...

We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation (see p.43, Topkis (1998)). We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex...