Managerial economics, which seeks to use microeconomic principles to solve managerial problems, has become firmly established in business curricula, particularly at the MBA level. Surveys of MBA directors and MBA alumni, however, have indicated that managerial economics tends to be an unpopular...

In this article, I advocate a different way to teach neoclassical microeconomic theory to graduate students in heterodox programs that accomplishes the goals of providing them with a critical and 'technical' understanding of neoclassical theory as well as a critical awareness of how heterodox...

We study the role of monotonicity in the characterization of incentive compatible allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, the mechanism designer may use monetary transfers, and agents have quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and transfers. It is well-known that monotonicity of the...

The classical bankruptcy problem (O''Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In...

This paper analyses the impact of educational interventions made in the first-and second-year microeconomics courses on academic development students' final mark in the second-year course. It also addresses issues of methodology, specification, and statistical analysis with respect to other...

In this paper we assume that choice of commodities at the individual (household) level is made in the budget set and that the choice can be described by a probability density function. We prove that negativity (()0xExp<) is valid for one(x) or two choice variables (x, y) (No Giffen good).Negativity at the market level is valid by summation. The expected demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. We use general positive continuous functions f(x), f(x, y) defined on the bounded budget set. We transform them into probability density functions to calculate E(x) and prove negativity. The present approach use simple assumptions and is descriptive in its nature. Any choice behaviour that can be described by a continuous density function gives the above results. (,,)xyppm Why not keep descriptions as simple as possible?<p>

We study a spatial model of party formation in which the set of agendas is the unit circle. We characterize the sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the plurality and proportional rules. In both rules, multiple configurations of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium. We refine our...

Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner''s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a...

We propose a new model to study the role of commitment as a sourceof strategic bargaining power. Two impatient players bargain aboutthe division of a pie under a standard bargaining protocol indiscrete time with time-invariant recognition probabilities.Instantaneous utility is linear, but...

We explore network effects on generosity for different network dimensions. To this end weelicit multiple network dimensions (friendship, social support, economic exchange, etc.) in arural village in the Southern hemisphere and measure generosity with a sequence of dictatorgames conducted in the...