We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive...

Prior archival studies of analysts' forecasts have found evidence for systematic underreaction, systematic overreaction, and systematic optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by testing the robustness of Abarbanell and Bernard's (1992)...

Prior archival studies of analysts' forecasts have found evidence for systematic underreaction, systematic overreaction, and systematic optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by testing the robustness of Abarbanell and Bernard's (1992)...

This chapter documents some open-book call asset markets that have a very large number of traders relative to traditional laboratory markets. The markets were conducted as out-of-class fully computerized extra-credit exercises in microeconomic theory classes at Indiana University. Students could...

This chapter focuses on the effect of non- binding price controls in double auction trading.Static price theory predicts that non-binding price ceilings and floors will have no effect on price determination in double auction markets. In fact they have substantial effects on price dynamics....

The voluntary provision of a pure public good is studied in the presence of an anonymous external donor. New data generated using experimental procedures employing both extra-credit and cash incentives, as well as asynchronous access to real-time decision rounds lasting several days, are...