A central issue currently debated among bank analysts and economists is whether mergers enhance the efficiency of surviving banks. This paper investigates the postmerger performance of acquiring banks that participated in a merger during the period 1980-90. The evidence suggests that acquirers...

We hypothesize that the intrinsic benefit required to trigger a refinancing has become smaller due to a combination of technological, regulatory, and structural changes that have made mortgage origination more competitive and more efficient. To test this hypothesis, we estimate an empirical...

The optimal prepayment model asserts that rational homeowners would refinance if they can reduce the current value of their liabilities by an amount greater than the refinancing threshold, defined as the cost of carrying the transaction plus the time value of the embedded call option. To compute...

This paper investigates whether the type of institutional affiliation of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) manager influences the manager's access to information and risk appetite. We base our investigation on CLO managers' trading of distressed loans. Our findings reveal that CLO managers...

The link between financial market concentration and stability is a topic of great interest to policymakers and other market participants. Are concentrated markets - those where a relatively small number of firms hold large market shares - inherently more prone to disruption? This article...

The current review of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has put the spotlight on the ratios used to assess banks' capital adequacy. This article examines the effectiveness of three capital ratios - the first based on leverage, the second on gross revenues, and the third on risk-weighted assets - in...

Many commentators have portrayed the tech boom of the late 1990s as an era of unprecedented deterioration in the quality of firms undertaking initial public offerings. But as far back as the early 1980s, firms seeking to go public were displaying signs of financial weakness, and the failure rate...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...