This paper uses rich, new data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average jet fleets at least 40 percent smaller than observably similar publicly-traded firms. Similar fleet...

We apply control rights theory to explain the structure and determinants of financial covenants in private equity backed leveraged buyouts. We analyze 130 German transactions from 2000 to 2008, covering about 40 percent of the LBO market during this period. We consider Germany to be a superior...

We study innovation and R&D investments made from 2008 to 2010 by UK companies that were the targets of leveraged buyout (LBO) in previous years. We find that overall, LBO companies do not exhibit lower innovation and R&D investments than non-LBO companies during the crisis, with other things...

In October 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Michigan Bankers Association and the New Economy Initiative for Southeast Michigan co-sponsored a symposium in Detroit that brought together business experts, business owners, policymakers, funders and bankers to explore issues around...

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations. The CRA performance impacts banks and the...

This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO,...

The fastest growing segment of private equity (PE) deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs)—sales from one PE fund to another. Using a comprehensive sample of leveraged buyouts, we investigate whether SBOs are value-maximizing, or reflect opportunistic behavior. To proxy for adverse incentives, we...