value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their … attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated … differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule …

Theory predicts that committees of experts may take decisions that look good but are bad and that they show a united … front to impress evaluators. Although evaluators see through this behavior, committees persist in it only to avoid worse … of committees, words speak louder than costly decisions. Evaluators pick this up. Orthogonality tests show that …

Theory predicts that committees of experts may take decisions that look good but are bad and that they show a united … front to impress evaluators. Although evaluators see through this behavior, committees persist in it only to avoid worse … of committees, words speak louder than costly decisions. Evaluators pick this up. Orthogonality tests show that …

committees are more likely to default than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of commitment by …

experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and … each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes …

interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this …Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of …

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …