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Game-theoretical approaches to the EU institutions : an overview and evaluation

Nurmi, Hannu - In: Homo oeconomicus 16 (1999/2000) 4, pp. 363-389

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001515348

Secret ballot elections and public-key cryptosystems

Nurmi, Hannu - In: European journal of political economy 8 (1992) 2, pp. 295-303

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001125894

Cancellation and reassignment of votes in secret ballot elections

Nurmi, Hannu - In: European journal of political economy 9 (1993) 3, pp. 427-435

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001146841

Making choices in the old-fashioned way

Berg, Sven - In: Economia delle scelte pubbliche : SP 6 (1989) 2, pp. 95-113

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001081224

A note on rough sets and common knowledge events

Salonen, Hannu; Nurmi, Hannu - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000977630

Computer simulations of approval and plurality voting : the frequency of weak pareto violations and condorcet loser choices in impartial cultures

Nurmi, Hannu - In: Europäische Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie : EZPÖ 2 (1986) 1, pp. 47-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001012790

A game theoretic approach to political characteristics of East-West trade

Kivikari, Urpo - In: Cooperation and conflict : journal of the Nordic … 21 (1986) 2, pp. 65-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001020180

[Rezension von: Nurmi, Hannu, Rational behaviour and the design of institutions]

Sutter, Matthias - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 52 (1999) 3, pp. 468-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001448672

Measuring disagreement in group choice settings

Nurmi, Hannu - In: Power and fairness, (pp. 313-331). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001729903

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Nurmi, Hannu - 2018

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012398286