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This paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with respect to manipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on the implementation of various alternatives, some of which imply opposite interests for the two subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009245991
In an experiment on a subjective claims problem we compare three unanimity bargaining procedures - the Demand, the Offer and the Exit variant - in terms of fairness and efficiency. To assess the fairness of the allocations obtained by these procedures, we evaluate them from a partial point of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839584
In a subjective claims problem several agents have contributed to the production of a cake which is to be divided among them. Since contributions are difficult to compare and the production function is nonlinear, agents'subjective evaluations of claims are likely to be conflicting. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700900
This experimental study investigates two bargaining games with twosided incomplete information between a seller and a buyer. In the first game with no outside options many subjects do not use the incomplete information to their advantage as predicted. We find that a model with adjusting priors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671920
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866812
This paper studies a two-sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer. The buyer has an outside option, which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can also choose to return to bargaining at any time. Two cases considered: In Regime I, both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009731150
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003568122
This paper studies a two-sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer. The buyer has an outside option, which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can also choose to return to bargaining at any time. Two cases considered: In Regime I, both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293421
This experimental study investigates two bargaining games with twosided incomplete information between a seller and a buyer. In the first game with no outside options many subjects do not use the incomplete information to their advantage as predicted. We find that a model with adjusting priors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294771
This paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with respect to manipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on the implementation of various alternatives, some of which imply opposite interests for the two subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294803