We examine a search money model in which there is a symmetric coincidence of wants in all barter matches. However, when … bargaining outcomes are asymmetric across matches, the barter economy is inefficient. Then a robust monetary equilibrium exists … provided that money holders enjoy adequate bargaining terms. Fiat money may be welfare inproving. In contrast to the literature …

seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous … price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium … disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large …

direct buyersʼ search and signal quality. A unique equilibrium exists and is separating. When the quality differential is …/or the number of sites created is inefficient, due to a conflict between the search-directing and signaling roles of prices. …

probability of negotiation breakdown in a bargaining protocol whose sequential equilibrium implements the optimal mechanism. …

is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure …. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the extent that proposers request a fixed price for a shared ride … positions of the bargaining parties are hardly symmetric and the formation of the full group is not guaranteed. Using a simple …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes … in isolated bilateral bargaining. …

show that a profit tax and a transaction tax have opposite implications for equilibrium outcome in bargaining. A marginal …

In his classic article An Essay on Bargaining Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather … than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …