We introduce a new nonparametric approach for estimating a simple varying coeffcient model with a unit root nonstationarity. Our method is based on a piecewise local least squares principle and is computationally simple to implement. We establish its asymptotic properties and evaluate its...

We study experimentally the effect on individual behavior of comparative, but payoff-irrelevant, information in a near-minimal group setting. Specifically, in each round, group members see the groups' cumulative payoffs, which consist of an aggregation of the earnings of each member of the group...

This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent's knowledge, but also, can impair his reasoning about what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li...

In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We find under which...

We investigate analytically and via Monte Carlo simulations the effects of the inclusion of irrelevant variables in the statistical model, on the cointegration analysis of Johansen (1988, 1991). We show that overspecifying the statistical model does not affect inference about the cointegrating...

This paper examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure. <br><br> Keywords;...

Linear altruism is a functional form used extensively in outcome-based models of social preferences: the underlying assumption is that individuals have a utility over monetary outcome profiles that depends on their and other players' payments. Behavior in strategic interactions is explained as a...

We model the behavior of agents who care about receiving what they feel they deserve in a two-player rank-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous...