We present comparative performance of cryptocurrencies by the performance index based on the Aumann-Serrano –henceforth, AS– economic index of riskiness. We consider three cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ethereum and Binance-coin, which have the largest market capitalizations among all...

This is a comment on Nomidis (2023). Using simple examples, the focus is on the conditions that lead to Cournot’s competitive limit result, showcasing the connections between the Cournot model and competitive equilibrium. Citing original sources, it is argued that the Neoclassical economists...

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term - logit...

Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not constitute an intermediate...

In an extremely interesting paper, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) [PV] introduce the axiomatic method to the problem of how to rank academic journals on the basis of their mutual citations. They characterize the invariant method as the only one satisfying a list of five appealing properties....

In an exchange economyw ith a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistakefree) process consist of (i) all core...