Can an information intermediary mitigate the harmful effect of persuasive communication? How does her success depend on her private information? We modify Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) Bayesian persuasion framework to accommodate a privately-informed intermediary representing the receiver’s...

The Slutsky matrix function encodes all the information about local variations in demand with respect to small (Slutsky) compensated price changes. When the demand function is the result of utility maximization the Slutsky matrix is symmetric. However, symmetry does not imply rationality. Here,...

Samuelson's (1938) weak (generalized) axiom of revealed preference- WGARP-is a minimal and appealing consistency condition of choice. We offer a rationalization of WGARP in general settings. Our main result is an exact analog of the celebrated Afriat's theorem, but for WGARP. Its ordinal...

This paper provides a noncooperative approach to core stability in an economy with incomplete information. The analysis covers general exchange economies, although our tightest results hold when effective coalitions consist of at most two players, as in matching. We study the perfect Bayesian...

In de Clippel, Saran, and Serrano (2019), it is shown that, perhaps surprisingly, the set of implementable social choice functions is essentially the same whether agents have bounded depth of reasoning or rational expectations. The picture is quite different when taking into account the...

Covers topics such as: models of economic exchange and production, uncertainty, optimality, public goods, social improvement criteria, life and death choices, majority voting, Arrow's theorem, and theories of implementation and mechanism design. This book aims to make value judgments about...

Consider any investor who fears ruin facing any set of investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing, he can purchase information about the state of nature in the form of an information structure. Given his prior, information structure is more informative than information structure if...