We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two di¤erent protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability...

In several jurisdictions, commercially exploiting a game of chance (rather than skill) is subject to a licensing regime. It is obvious that roulette is a game of chance and chess a game of skill, but the law does not provide a precise description of where the boundary between the two classes is...

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior...

In this paper, we address the concept of trust by combining (i) the self-reported trust and belief in trustworthiness of others from a general unpaid questionnaire, (ii) choices made in a social valuation task designed to measure subjects' distributional preferences, (iii) strategies submitted...

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has...

This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

In many contexts, players interact only with a subset of the whole population, i.e., players interact on a network. This paper a setting in which players are located on a network and play a fixed game with their neighbors. Players have incomplete information on the network structure. They have a...