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Chapter 19 Experimental Methods and Valuation

Shogren, Jason F. - In: Handbook of environmental economics : volume 2, Valuing …, (pp. 969-1027). 2005

This chapter explores how economists use experimental methods to understand better the behavioral underpinnings of environmental valuation. Economic experiments, in the lab or field, are an attractive tool to address intricate incentive and contextual questions that arise in assessing values...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023920

Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information

Reuter, Marco - 2023 - Last update: November 8, 2023

I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440016

Regret minimization and separation in multi-bidder, multi-item auctions

Koçyiğit, Çağıl; Kuhn, Daniel; Rujeerapaiboon, Napat - In: INFORMS journal on computing : JOC ; charting new … 36 (2024) 6, pp. 1543-1561

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015164616

Auctioning process innovations when losers' bids determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935644

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935649

Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2007 - April (revised) 2007

profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365856

Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

Hu, Luke - 2012

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571029