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Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512633
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. In contrast with the principal-agent models that are extended within, here...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281584
In Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch\'s (1992) specific model, it is showed that conformist behaviors can emerge due to information externalities. In this note we establish that this result, based on `informational cascades\', heavily depends on the choice of a particular tie-breaking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385262
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We investigate pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie-breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260327
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500423
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014388774
In this paper we analyze the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in Banerjee’s model of herd behavior. Changing one assumption we obtain three important results: players’ strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576483