In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to...

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained...

This paper presents a model of the jobmarket in which the number of workers and companies is a Poisson random variable, as in Poisson games. The model has undominated equilibria that share some properties with directed search, while preserving some erratic elements typical of random search

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...

We offer an example of the job market where the number of agents is uncertain, modeling it as a Poisson game. We allow for heterogeneity of companies and workers, and show that in equilibrium more productive types choose higher terms of trade

We prove that for generic network formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.