In this study, we implement a series of voting games in the laboratory to test whether a strategic voting behavior in a proportional system would arise and induce a two-party system. In each voting game, a finite number of subjects with single-peaked preferences, uniformly distributed on a...

We offer an example of the job market where the number of agents is uncertain, modeling it as a Poisson game. We allow for heterogeneity of companies and workers, and show that in equilibrium more productive types choose higher terms of trade

In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes

In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the "perfect" equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are...