FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents’ performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...

We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...

Some financial disruptions that started in California, U.S., in March 2023, resulting in the closure of several medium-size U.S. banks, shed new light on the role of liquidity in business cycle dynamics. In the normal path of the business cycle, liquidity and output mutually interact. Small...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

This paper presents a dynamic model of complex system dynamics vulnerable to loss of resilience, cycles, and contractions. We use a limit cycle model built upon Koçkesen & Semmler (2017) to evaluate Brunnermeirs’s theory of Resilience in the light of complex system dynamics and discuss the...