We investigate how coordination requirement, measured by the coordination parameter, affects the occurrence of miscoordination-based bank runs in controlled laboratory environments. We identify an indeterminacy region of the coordination parameter such that games with the parameter within the...

The data from experiments with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism suggest five stylized facts, including the restart effect. To date, no theory has explained all of these facts simultaneously. We merge our Individual Evolutionary Learning model with a variation of heterogenous other-regarding...

This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talk announcements in an agent-based dynamic extension of the Kydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makes a non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actual inflation rate. It updates its decisions using...

We introduce learning in a principal-agent model of output sharing under moral hazard. We use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) and individual evolutionary learning (IEL) to represent individual learning. Learning in...

Abstract We are interested in how Groves-Ledyard mechanisms perform when used repeatedly in a sequence of one-shot games where agents know only their own preferences. In particular, how fast do the mechanisms converge to the stage game Nash equilibrium and how does that speed of convergence...

This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talkinflation announcements in an agent-based dynamic extension of theKydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makesa non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actualinflation rate. It updates its decisions...