I investigate the idea that campaign spending limits may help to level the playing field in electoral competition between parties who have unequal access to campaign funds. The model assumes that the supporters of one party are on average wealthier than those who support a competing party....

The note documents and discusses the modalities and consequences of the phenomenon of siphoning profits of state enterprises for private uses by state enteprise managers and insiders in Bulgaria during the period of early transition.

The United Kingdom began deregulating its electric market years before the U.S. Thus, the UK provides the best example of what can be expected in the deregulated residential retail electric market in the United States. . An extensive review of the evidence found: Questionable price savings:...

In this contribution we illustrate various applications of a behavioural microsimulation model that we have been developing during the last years. Behavioural models are complex and costly tools to develop, use and maintain, but also very powerful ones as we wish to show through the examples...

Mature federations have relatively transparent delineations of authority among levels of government; subnational governments enjoy considerable autonomy in their expenditure, revenue, and debt policies. In other countries, problems of soft budget constraints, bailouts, and fiscal and financial...

El objetivo de este paper es realizar una descripción del caso brasileño, en lo que hace a la salida de un sistema en el cual el ancla nominal de la economía era un tipo de cambio semi-fijo, hacia un régimen de flotación “cuasi” limpia de la moneda, en el que el ancla de la economía...

This paper explores the possibility to collect the information on the non-pension cash benefits by using the administrative data sources. Firstly, we describe the framework of the Italian ITS on social protection and define the units of analysis. Afterwards, we review the Bodies holding sources...

In the model presented here, $n$ parties choose policy positions in a space $Z$ of dimension at least two. Each party has true preferences on $Z$ that are unknown to other agents. In the first version of the model considered the party declarations determine the lottery outcome of coalition...