We analyze the contracting problem between a shopping mall and potential anchors (large stores) in a market where consumers with high search costs must choose shopping destinations prior to learning prices. Our model incorporates the interaction between contracting and asymmetric firm sizes into...

In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best-response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability...

In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and...

We extend the global games method to the class of finite player, finite action games that includes games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and arbitrary combinations of the two. Our result is based on common order properties present in both strategic complements and...

We investigate the accuracy of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis when there are cost efficiencies from a horizontal merger. We include model-based, merger-specific cost efficiencies in a tractable manner and extend the standard UPP formulation to account for these efficiencies. The efficacy of...

Strategic complements are well understood for normal form games, but less so for extensive form games. There is some evidence that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games (Echenique (2004)). We study necessary and sufficient conditions for...

We study proliferation of an action in a network coordination game that is generalized to include a tractable, model-based measure of virality to make it more realistic. We present new algorithms to compute contagion thresholds and equilibrium depth of contagion and prove their theoretical...