We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that...

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition...

Laboratory experiments reporting on shortfalls from allocative efficiency of allocation mechanisms depend on the induced-values methodology, which cannot be extended to the field. Harstad [2011] proposes to observe efficiency of allocation mechanisms without knowing motivations via behavior in...

Economic experiments conducted in laboratories employing an induced-values methodology can report on allocative efficiencies observed. This methodology is limited by requiring the experimenter to know subjects' motivations, an impossibility in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a...

Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur...