Recent policy initiatives within the harmonization of European company laws have promoted a so-called "principle of proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by...

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. <p> We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- <p> lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and <p> transmit policy relevant information. <p> The paper also shows...</p></p></p></p>

We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects <p> interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision <p> of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that <p> the effectiveness of lobbying lies in...</p></p></p>

Economists have long acknowledged that the structure of the family (number of offspring, marital status, etc.) plays a crucial role in important economic decisions (e.g., labor supply, demand patterns, portfolio choice, educational attainment). In this paper we investigate the link between...

Interest groups can influence political decisions in two distinct ways: <p> by offering contributions to political actors and by providing them with relevant information that is favorable for the group. We analyze the conditions under which interest groups are more inclined to use one or the other...</p>

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This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature’s willingness to delegate decision-making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the...

Firms in the European countries today have the possibility of choosing from a range of control enhancing mechanisms giving the controlling owners an amount of influence which is disproportional to their share of cash flow. The list of control enhancing mechanisms includes dual class shares,...

Boards are endogenously chosen institutions determined by observable and unobservable firm characteristics. Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have successfully controlled for observable determinants of board size and shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm...

Se WP.