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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Lindner, Axel - 2008
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269906
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Lindner, Axel - 2007
complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269917
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Lindner, Axel - Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) - 2008
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005426752
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Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy
Lindner, Axel - In: Topics in Macroeconomics 9 (2009) 1, pp. 1801-1801
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005046451
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? : some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? Some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496184
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Why the publication of socially harmful information may be socially desirable
Hahn, Volker - 2009 - This version: November 2009
signaling incentives under opacity. Our model may also explain the recent trend towards more transparency in monetary policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746680
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Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence
Duffy, John; Heinemann, Frank - 2016 - This Draft: 2 December 2016
explore whether central bank cheap talk, policy transparency, both cheap talk and policy transparency or economic transparency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? Some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI) - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860044
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Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information
Trabelsi, Emna - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
In earlier theoretical framework, Morris and Shin (2002) highlight the potential dangers of transparency policy. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694017