We first review the literature pertaining to the protection of the modern sector in developing countries (DCs). We then discuss the nexuses between protection, economic dualism, and optimal environmental policy in DCs. Next, in the theoretical part of the paper, we construct a dynamic model of...

We analyze a dynamic model of environmental policy in a stylized developing country (DC) with a dual economy. This DC’s economy is distorted because the government subsidizes the exports of the non-polluting sector of the economy. We analyze the employment and output effects of three different...

Ecologists and economists are increasingly in agreement that ecological and economic systems are linked and that these systems should be viewed as one system. However, because this recognition has been recent, there are very few formal studies of jointly determined ecologicaleconomic systems...

We use the theory of continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) to analyze hitherto unstudied questions about jointly determined ecological-economic systems. Two specific questions are examined. First, on the methodological front, we show how the theory of CTMCs can be used to effectively model...

We analyze two questions concerning the conservation of biodiversity in a dynamic and stochastic framework. First, given the link between natural habitats and biodiversity, when should a social planner stop the habitat conversion process? Second, what is the nexus between a social planner’s...

In this paper we have examined optimal tariffs for non-renewable natural resources in the setting of imperfect competition. We do this because Larry Karp (1984, p. 74) states that, “If the buyer attempts to exert market power, he is constrained by the dynamic optimization behavior of the...

In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will...

The process of environmental regulation is usually a two-step one. In the first step, a standard for environmental quality is set. Then, in the second step, a regulatory mechanism is put in place to achieve the standard. In this paper I show how renewal theory can be used to set the quality...

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive...