Similar Search Results

Nyman, Ingmar; Baker, Matthew - Department of Economics, Hunter College - 2012

We study a labor market in which principals and agents must search for a trading partner, and agents have private … match. This leads to insufficient frictional unemployment and search, and lower average productivity and utility. A fully …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812030

Assortative matching through signals

Poeschel, Friedrich - 2013

When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents could direct their search to agents who … strategically choose a certain signal. Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we find that signals …-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128388

Information, intermediaries, and international migration

Bazzi, Samuel; Cameron, Lisa Ann; Schaner, Simone; … - 2022

are consistent with an increase in the option value of search: with better ability to differentiate offer quality, workers … search longer, select higher-quality intermediaries, and ultimately have better migration experiences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013363679

Simultaneous search and adverse selection

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2024

We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014494073

The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information

Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard J.; Fujiwara, Ippei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1319-1368

This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937351

Co-essentiality of money and credit : a mechanism-design view

Buggenum, Hugo van; Rabinovich, Stanislav - In: Journal of economic theory 213 (2023), pp. 1-26

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472242

Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

Heumann, Tibor - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 319-359

We study a principal--agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159075

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders' information, for a fixed distribution of private values. In a two bidder, two value, setting, we characterize all combinations of bidder surplus and revenue that can arise, and identify the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895653

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between buyer and seller. We identify necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281

Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification

Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji; Yang, Xiangqian - 2022

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal can costly verify agents' private signals. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243581