We compare top management compensation among prospector, defender, and analyzer strategic types, and the effects of differences in managers' employment risks, firm performance, and firm size. Prospectors performed better and they paid their top management group more than did analyzers. They were...

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient...

Related link(s): http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/region_focus/2009/spring/policy_update_weblinks.cfm

This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. banking industry. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. We...

Designing compensation schemes is complicated, because of the difficulties in measuring performance and tying it to the actions of employees.