We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilbria in nonatomic games We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of actions sets cannot be relaxed and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper

We show that the main theorem in Al-Najjar's 1995 Econometrica paper is false We provide additional references for the residual implications that are valid but point our that these standard implications are incapable of bearing the interpretative weight that Al-Najjar places on them

The process by which high-level office-holder are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues

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We adapt an elegant piece of reasoning by Balasko (1979) to the implete markets modelled by Duffie and Shafer (1985) and prove that on compact sets of such markets the Lebesgue measure of economies with m equilibria is 0 (1/m)

Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms?prices are private information and their quantities are public information; an information structure consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric duopoly games, it is...

We explore the evolution of the structure and performance of a social network in a population of individuals who search for local optima in diverse and dynamic task environments. Individuals choose whether to innovate or imitate and, in the latter case, from whom to learn. The probabilities of...

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Discrete choice models are usually derived from the assumption of random utility maximization We consider the reverse problem whether choice probablities are consistent with maximization of random utilities This leads to tests that consider the variation in these choice probabilities with the...