The invisible hand theorem relates nothing about the attributes of the optimal allocation vector. In this paper, we identify a convex cone of functions such that order on vectors of exogenous heterogeneity parameters induces component-wise order on allocation vectors for firms in an efficient...

A three-region world model for the soybean complex is developed to evaluate the welfare effects of Roundup Ready (RR) soybean adoption. The structural modeling of the innovation accounts for farmers' adoption incentives and for the observed pricing of RR soybean seeds as a proprietary...

We relate the labeling of genetically modified (GM) products to the theory of grading and minimum quality standards. The model represents three stages in the supply chain, assumes a vertical product differentiation framework, allows for the accidental commingling of non-GM products, and treats...

Our context involves N firms producing M products at constant marginal costs, and behaving as Cournot oligopolists. When preferences are quasi-linear, we study the relationships between second moments of unit costs and second moments of firm-level production. Larger variance in unit costs of a...

A partial-equilibrium, two-country model is developed to analyze implications from the introduction of genetically modified (GM) products. In the model, innovators hold proprietary rights, farmers are (competitive) adopters, some consumers deem GM food to be inferior in quality to traditional...

Abstract Currently Unavailable.

Market concentration ratios are popular statistics for characterizing the extent of market dominance in an imperfectly competitive market, but these ratios may not agree when comparing two markets. Neither do they necessarily agree with the Herfindahl-Hirschman or entropy indices. This letter...

Abstract Currently Unavailable.

This paper constructs an equilibrium model of the supply behavior of an industry comprised of utility maximizing owner-operators, and derives its implications for empirical work. Except for the case of long-run constant costs, the perverse results for the firm (a backwar d-bending labor supply...

Taking location as given, we study imperfect competition on a circular city. In Bertrand oligopoly, we identify price harmonics as a function of firm unit costs and locations. The sum of oligopoly profits is larger when costs and/or locations are more dispersed in the...