Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better...

We use a standard general equilibrium trade model to show that export and import policies are not symmetric in the equilibrium of a strategic game with quotas. We assume N (identical) large countries non-cooperatively set their import (or export) quotas to maximize domestic welfare. We show that...

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity...

This paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the...

This paper investigates the policy active importersï¾’ incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade polices in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not...

Abstract currently unavailable.

Abstract Currently Unavailable.

Abstract Currently Unavailable.