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strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491761
We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421803
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009671097
large number of applications, especially in auction theory, affiliation has limitations that are important to be aware of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009237134
at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now" format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and … auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406561
at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now" format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and … auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407823
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769030
independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373